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ABSTRACT
Consumer IoT is characterized by heterogeneous devices with di-
verse functionality and programming interfaces. This lack of ho-
mogeneity makes the integration and security management of IoT
infrastructures a daunting task for users and administrators. In
this paper, we introduce VISCR, a Vendor-Independent policy Spec-
ification and Conflict Resolution engine that enables conflict-free
policy specification and enforcement in IoT environments. VISCR
converts the topology of the IoT infrastructure into a tree-based
abstraction and translates existing policies from heterogeneous
vendor-specific programming languages such as Groovy-based
SmartThings, OpenHAB, IFTTT-based templates, and MUD-based
profiles into a vendor-independent graph-based specification. Using
the two, VISCR can automatically detect rouge policies, conflicts,
and bugs for coherent automation. Upon detection, VISCR infers
new policies and proposes them to users as alternatives to existing
policies for fine-tuning and conflict-free enforcement. We evaluated
VISCR using a dataset of 907 IoT apps, programmed using hetero-
geneous automation specifications in a simulated smart-building
IoT infrastructure. In our experiments, among 907 IoT apps, VISCR
exposed 342 of IoT apps as exhibiting one or more violations. VISCR
detected 100% of violations reported by existing state-of-the-art tool,
while detecting new types of violations in an additional 266 apps.
In terms of performance, VISCR can generate 400 abstraction trees
(used in specifying policies) with 100K leaf nodes in <1.2sec. In our
experiments, VISCR took 80.7 seconds to analyze our infrastructure
of 907 apps; a 14.2× reduction compared to the state-of-the-art.
After the initial analysis, VISCR is capable of adopting new policies
in sub-second latency to handle changes.
1 INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to an explosion
in the number of devices integrated into consumer IoT infrastruc-
tures (e.g., “smart homes”, “smart campus”, and “smart cities”) [1, 2].
The heterogeneity of these infrastructures poses two major chal-
lenges in developing and enforcing policies across them:
(1) Coherent Policy Expression: Today, IoT device vendors support
web and mobile-based apps, wide range of IoT automation frame-
works, and specification languages [3–7] that allow users and
administrators to program their IoT infrastructures. However,
directly capturing the high-level automation (or policy) intent
of IoT administrators, using these vendor-specific IoT apps, is
a challenging task as it requires administrators of the IoT in-
frastructure to manually decompose their high-level intents into
device-specific rules prior to installation onto IoT infrastructures.
(2) Conflict-free Enforcement: Consumer IoT infrastructures are pro-
grammed by multiple administrators having complex roles and
varying levels of skill, which may include novice smart-home
users (e.g., parents, kids), smart-campus or smart-city admin-
istrators (e.g., HVAC admins, fire-safety admins). Configuring
conflict-free automation in such multi-administrative environ-
ments is a tedious process.
Recent studies independently underscore the need for new access
control and policy frameworks to address specifically the security
goals of IoT ecosystem [8–10]. These solutions are designed to
identify violations in IoT device ecosystems with homogeneous pro-
gramming specifications, which does not apply to contemporary
consumer IoT deployments that commonly involve devices using
diverse vendor-specific APIs and heterogeneous programming spec-
ifications. Furthermore, existing tools either rely on model checking
for static analysis of IoT automation programs to detect the con-
flicts [9], or require IoT automation code to be instrumented for
detecting run-time violations [10]. Existing tools and techniques
also leave a wide spectrum of automation bugs and conflicts un-
detected. For example, gap in automation due to lack of expertise
among administrators, rogue policies on infrastructures that the user
does not control, violations that might arise due to loops among
automation rules, and other potential run-time violations are some
of the key issues left unaddressed by the existing automation frame-
works (discussed in §5).
In this paper, we introduce “VISCR”, a new intent-based IoT
policy automation framework. For effectively accommodating the
automation rules and policies that are specified in the existing
IoT infrastructure using heterogeneous programming specification
languages, VISCR builds vendor-independent graph-based specifi-
cation model. VISCR translates the IoT automation programs speci-
fied using groovy-based programs for smarthings [5], OpenHAB-
based rules [3], MUD-profiles [6] and IFTTT-based applets [7] into
vendor-independent graph-based specifications (§ 4.1). In addition,
VISCR allows administrators of an IoT infrastructure to directly
and succinctly capture their dynamic automation use-cases and
policy intents in a vendor-independent manner using simple and
intuitive graph-based abstractions and specification mechanism
(§ 4.3). VISCR uses these graphs to detect bugs and conflicts across
policies that could otherwise go undetected using existing model
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checking-based tools [9, 10]. These include: (a) static compile-time
conflicts, (b) gap in the automation, (c) conflicts due to loops among
automation rules, (d) code sanity bugs, (e) access violations, and
(f ) rogue policies.
VISCR supports PRECEDENCE operator, for automatically resolv-
ing the conflicts, while unresolved conflicts are forwarded to appro-
priate IoT users or administrators for manual resolution. The policy
reconciliation engine decomposes the composed conflict-free policy
graph into set of device-specific rules for enforcement onto actual
devices (e.g., IoT devices, IoT Gateways) as IoT apps and ACL rules.
In addition, VISCR infers new policy and propose it to IoT users for
fine-tuning the existing policies, while addressing the security and
safety violations that arise among the policies (§5.3.4). We evalu-
ate VISCR on a simulated smart-building IoT infrastructure with
907 apps. VISCR detected a wide range of bugs i.e., ≈37.7% of IoT
apps are reported for one or more conflicts and bugs compared to
≈8.4% of static compile-time conflicts detected with existing model
checking-based tool [9] while incurring less than 3.8% false posi-
tives. We discuss the resultant conflicts and bugs detected by VISCR
and their categories in §6.
In summary, our paper makes the following key contributions:
• Wedesign VISCR, a vendor-independent graph-based policy spec-
ificationmechanism that translates automation rules and policies
specified using heterogeneous programming specification lan-
guages into vendor-independent graph-based policies. We carry
out security analysis of VISCR to evaluate the code sanity and
detect bugs present in the code. We develop intuitive policy spec-
ification mechanism using tree-based abstractions that allows
users to directly capture the vendor-independent graph-based
policies for automation and policy specification (§4).
• VISCR detects bugs and conflicts that arise among the policies
represented in vendor-independent graph-based specification
and resolve them using PRECEDENCE operation for conflict-free
enforcement. We developed techniques to automatically infer
new policies for proposing it to user for fine-tuning the existing
rules (§5).
• We evaluate VISCR using 907 IoT apps (i.e., both vetted and un-
vetted) in a simulated smart building infrastructure with real
world automation use cases reported by IoT users and adminis-
trators in their IoT infrastructures and compare with existing
techniques (§6).
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A wide variety of automation frameworks and specification lan-
guages are supported by vendors for automating IoT infrastruc-
tures [3–7]. Such heterogeneity makes programming the IoT infras-
tructure a challenging task.
In addition, the presence of multiple administrators1 in IoT infras-
tructures with different roles & responsibilities further complicates
the situation resulting in conflicts and errors among IoT infras-
tructure automation. Hence, the heterogeneity, and lack of a uni-
fied policy-specification in multi-administrative IoT infrastructures
1For example, the smart home automation rules and policies are specified by the
members of the family (e.g., parents, kids, guests), while smart campus and enterprise
IoT infrastructures are managed by different types of IoT administrators such as HVAC,
fire-safety, utilities & energy, and infrastructure (or building) administrators.
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Figure 1: IoT devicemisbehavior due to commonly seen code sanity
issues [12–14]: (1) Code snippet 1: Misaligned parenthesis leading
to log incorrectly reporting the state change of coffee machine (2)
Code snippet 2: Illustrating empty If/Else blocks, (3) Code snippet
3: Missing conditional block closures or missing quotes. Some code
might hidden in the above examples for brevity.
forces administrators to independently develop automation policies
and exchange their policies offline. Such independently-developed
policies, which are often exchanged offline are manually inspected
for detecting the conflicts and violations. For effectively automating
the IoT infrastructures and governing the communication among
its devices following policies are required:
Trigger- & Action-based Rules: Automation rules that allow the
administrator to specify policies on a set of devices that perform
some action in response to an event (e.g., ). Example of programming
specification mechanisms used for these type of policies includes
SmartThings Groovy-based rules [5], OpenHAB-based rules [3],
IFTTT-based applets [7], and Apple HomeKit [11].
ACL-based Policies: ACL-based policies restrict the type of com-
munication the IoT devices are permitted, during normal and abnor-
mal states, within the IoT ecosystem. Examples include MUD-based
profiles [6] and traditional IP-based filtering rules.
2.1 Intuitive Policy Specification
IoT infrastructures are typically managed by multiple administra-
tors, each of them responsible for the management of a specific
group of devices. For effectively capturing policy intents from mul-
tiple administrators, a policy framework should support following
capabilities: (i) Ability to logically group devices in accordance
with the policy requirements of each of the administrator. For ex-
ample, the IoT administrators handling cameras of BLDG1 and
BLDG2 of the campus network should have abstractions that logi-
cally group the devices belonging to those locations; (ii) Provide
isolation among administrators while exposing only the necessary
abstractions required for policy specification avoiding rogue policies
from being specified. For example, a fire-safety administrator should
not be exposed to other IoT infrastructure details (e.g., cameras,
HVACs etc.) unless cross-device policy specification is required.
Currently, it is challenging to provide logical isolation across
different policy administrators and the devices they administer,
which motivates the need for fine-grained abstractions and logical
grouping of IoT devices as shown in Figure 6. Similarly, as shown in
Figure 1, using heterogeneous automation specification languages
2
Eco-
system
Goal Policy Intents of the IoT Administrator
P1 Campus Safety,
Privacy
Allow video feeds from camera to be sent to fire-safety
admins in event of fire alarm.
P2 Campus Security Cameras for active monitoring is turned OFF between
9 PM and 7AM. Cameras are turned ON only when
motion is detected.
Conflict: Policies P1 and P2 leads to potential security & safety violation in smart
campus. When video feed is shared with fire-safety staff, the video feed is interrupted
by the camera’s idle-time event which turns OFF the camera.
P3 Home Safety Between 10 PM and 7 AM open the main door to kids
and guests only with authorized user’s approval (e.g.,
parents).
P4 Home Safety In case of a fire-alarm event, initially warn users, and
then open the windows and doors to allow residents
to exit safely.
Conflict: Concurrent activation of policies P3 and P4 in a smart home leads to a
potential safety violation. In case of a fire alarm after 10 P.M., the IoT automation
keeps the door locked due to policy P3, preventing kids from leaving and fire-safety
officers from entering.
Table 1: Policy conflict examples in consumer IoT Infrastructures.
in the IoT infrastructures is prone to errors due to administrator’s
lack of expertise in programming [12, 13, 15–17].
■ Research Goal: The aforementioned challenges motivate the
need for an intuitive graph-based specification mechanism that is
vendor-independent and allows IoT administrators to easily capture
their policy intents while avoiding the steep learning curves with
existing automation specification languages.
2.2 Conflict Detection & Resolution
Policy intents of an IoT administrator are implemented using dis-
crete automation rules configured onto each device using the mo-
bile or web-based user interfaces, and automation specification
languages [3, 5, 6, 18]. The existing consumer IoT ecosystem lacks
means to effectively detect the conflicts, bugs and violations that
arise among the policies (i.e., captured independently by each of
the administrators using heterogeneous specification languages)
and reconcile them onto each of the IoT devices.
Recent studies have demonstrated that major vulnerabilities in
the IoT infrastructure are commonly due to simple human errors
and lack of expertise in policy configuration [12, 13, 19, 20]. As
highlighted in Table 1 & Table 4, there are range of automation bugs,
policy conflicts and violations (e.g., gap in automation, potential run-
time conflicts, and code sanity bugs) that could go undetected with
existing conflict detection techniques [9, 10, 21]. Let us consider
following policy conflicts:
Policy Conflict 1: Consider for example two policies P3 and P4 with
conflicting actions in opening main door (Table 1). In case of a
fire alarm after 10 P.M., (both policies P3 and P4 are activated) the
current IoT automation keeps the door locked due to policy P3,
preventing users from leaving and fire-safety officers from entering.
Proactively detecting such conflicting actions resulting in safety
violations in compile-time is a challenging task.
Policy Conflict 2: As shown in Table 1, policies P1 and P2 result in
run-time violation. When video feed is shared with fire-safety staff,
the video feed is interrupted by the camera’s idle-time event which
turns OFF the camera interrupting the video feed from being shared,
leading to safety violations. A major concern with such policies is
that they are activated in response to an event received from one or
more sensors. Such violations are difficult to be proactively detected
and resolved in compile-time as the asynchronous inactivity counter
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Figure 2: VISCR: Overall system architecture.
is triggered, which depends on environmental conditions, (i.e., time
and motion sensing).
■ Research Goal: The aforementioned examples demonstrate the
need for collaboration across administrators of IoT infrastructures
for charting out their policies and manually resolving conflicts that
arise among their policies before enforcing them onto the IoT in-
frastructure. Thus, a fundamental requirement for any IoT-based
policy framework is to effectively handle the dynamic character-
istics of IoT infrastructure, automatically adapt to such dynamic
changes and enforce a new set of policies by proactively detecting
and resolving conflicts that might arise at run-time.
3 VISCR SYSTEM DESIGN
To address the limitations of existing IoT automation and policy
framework, we make case for unified intent-based policy framework
that provides vendor-independent policy specification and conflict-
free policy enforcement mechanisms for IoT infrastructures.
3.1 Overview
As shown in Figure 2, the automation rules captured using various
vendor-specific automation and policy specification languages [3, 5–
7] are provided as input to the code sanity and graph generation
module ( 2 ). As a first step, VISCR analyses IoT automation pro-
grams to detect sanity bugs present in it (Section 4.2). After the ini-
tial sanity analysis is performed, VISCR translates the IoT programs
(i.e., specified using heterogeneous specification languages) into
vendor-independent graph-based specifications. VISCR maintains
mapping between the IoT programs, associated device configura-
tions, and graph-based policies as policy mappings, which is used
in policy enforcement i.e., for reconciling composed policy graph
to device-specific rules, as discussed in Section 5.3.4.
For translation of vendor-specific automation rules to vendor-
independent graph-based policies we have built necessary lexing
and parsing grammar (.g4), and mapping (.map) files specific to
each of the automation specification language with ANTLR (§4.1).
To enhance usability of our policy framework, VISCR also sup-
ports a graph-based policy specification user interface ( 3 ) i.e.,
with simple drag-and-drop option to input policy entities using
the tree-based infrastructure abstractions supplied to each of the
administrator. This allows IoT users and administrators to easily
and intuitively capture their policy intents in a vendor-independent
3
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Figure 3: VICE: Functional flow architecture overview.
manner without any need to learn multiple IoT automation pro-
gramming languages. The IoT infrastructure details (i.e., tree-based
IoT infrastructure abstractions) necessary for specifying the poli-
cies are automatically derived from the existing IoT infrastructure
and its cloud data sources ( 1 ).
In the next step, these vendor-independent graph-based policies
(from 2 & 3 ) are supplied as input to the vendor-independent con-
flict detection and resolution engine (VICE) for detecting conflicts,
violations and bugs among them these policies. Especially, VICE de-
tects rogue policies ( 4 ) that are configured by policy administrators
who are not authorized to specify automation rules or policies on
any specific portion of the IoT infrastructure (Section 4.3.2). Further,
in the next step the policies that are detected for rogue policies
are provided as input the policy composition engine (i.e., conflict
detection and resolution engine 5 ), as shown in Figure 3. Policy
composition engine uses precedence mechanism for automatically
resolving the conflicts among the policies. Unresolved conflicts and
bugs are reported to the administrators of IoT infrastructure for
manual resolution.
The composition engine send the composed policy graph to the
security analysis module for further inspection of violations ( 6 ),
which detects following types of conflicts and bugs among the
policies that makes infrastructure vulnerable and prone to errors
(Section 5.3): (i) gap in the automation that couldmake infrastructure
vulnerable, (ii) loops that exist among automation rules, (iii) access
violations, and (iv) potential conflicts that could arise in run-time.
The VISCR’s policy inference engine ( 7 ) automatically infers
policies specific to each of the conflicts and propose it to users for
fine-tuning the existing policies (Section 5.3.4). The policies that are
fine-tuned are once again composed for detecting the conflicts ( 4 ).
Finally, the identified composed conflict-free policy graphs, and
policy mappings are sent to the policy reconciliation module ( 8 ) for
enforcing the policies as device-specific rules. Finally, the vendor-
specific configurations and reconciled IoT apps are generated as
outcome of the reconciliation module for installing conflict-free
rules on to the IoT infrastructure.
3.2 Usage Scenario & Threat Model
VISCR’s intended use is within consumer IoT infrastructures, which
includes smart home, smart campus, smart city IoT infrastruc-
tures, and enterprise networks. Though, the VISCR’s architecture
is generic enough to accommodate Industrial IoT, but it is out of
scope considering different use case scenarios and requirements in
industrial ecosystem. VISCR aims to proactively reduce the conflicts
among policies, violations and bugs that arise in automating the IoT
infrastructures. VISCR provides necessary isolation across users or
administrators by delegating their roles and responsibilities through
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Figure 4: Functional block diagram of Code sanity and Graph gen-
eration Module. Architecture for generating Vendor-Independent
graph-based specifications from vendor-specific automation rules.
supply of dedicated Infrastructure abstraction tress, through which
the policies could be specified. In case of conflicts that arise among
the policies of different administrators the policies are enforced
only after the resolution is made and according to the precedence
of its administrators. VISCR’s policy inference mechanism proposes
new policies that allows users or administrators to fine-tune their
IoT ecosystem or resolve the bugs that exist among its policies. The
firmware bugs and vulnerabilities are out of scope of this work.
Under this usage scenario, we adopt simple and realistic threat
model. We trust the IoT devices and its firmware. Hence, we assume
that the IoT administrators or users are either novice or could be
malicious. We expect skilled administrators can craft policies that
could make network vulnerable. Similarly, the novice user’s lack
of skills could result in IoT infrastructure automation that might
result in gap in the automation, which could make network vul-
nerable. Our threat model considers the conflicts that arise in IoT
infrastructures programmed using following programming spec-
ification languages such as IFTTT-based Applets, Groovy-based
SmartThings, OpenHAB programs and MUD-profiles. Other pro-
gramming specifications such as Apple HomeKit and other pro-
gramming specifications are out of scope and will be supported by
the VISCR framework as part of its future work.
In our threat model, we assume that a subset of IoT users and
administrators who program the IoT ecosystem could be malicious.
We attempt to address issues that arise from flaws in the imple-
mentation of IoT programs as well as vulnerabilities introduced
by malicious users. VISCR proposes to use pessimistic approach by
which administrators can program for safety policies from specific
users and for specific set of devices and their capabilities are given
higher precedence compared to security and privacy policies of
others. Though the precedence is completely programmable, but, it
solely depends on users ability to correctly use it, which could at
times mask the conflicts. Hence, precedence operator need to be used
diligently by administrators for auto-resolving the conflicts that
are detected by VISCR, which could otherwise be safely resolved
manually by users.
4 VI SPECIFICATION & IOT APP ANALYSIS
Realizing coherent automation in existing IoT infrastructures that
uses heterogeneous specification languages (i.e., multiple automa-
tion frameworks) is a challenging task, which requires administra-
tors to analyze each of the IoT Apps for detecting the conflicts and
bugs for manually resolving them. The whole procedure of manu-
ally detecting conflicts and resolving them is a tedious process and
could be prone to error. Hence, we propose a vendor-independent
specification engine (VISCR) that serves following key purpose:
4
(i) Translates IoT automation programs and policies specified us-
ing Groovy, IFTTT, MUD, and OpenHAB-based programs into a
vendor-independent graph-based specification, and (ii) Analyzes
the IoT Apps for its sanity.
4.1 Vendor-Independent Model
As illustrated in Figure 2, Code sanity and Graph generator module
of VISCR engine consumes vendor-specific IoT Apps (i.e., IFTTT-
based Applets, Groovy-based SmartThings, OpenHAB programs)
and translate them into vendor-independent trigger and action-
based policies (as shown in Figure 7a). Similarly, the MUD profiles2
and translated into vendor-independent graph-based ACL policies
(as shown in Figure 7b). This approach allows each of the functional
component of VISCR i.e., composition engine to operate seamlessly
on vendor-independent (VI) model. As shown in Figure 4, VISCR
generates the vendor-independent (VI) graph-based policies using
following key functional modules:
• ANTLR parser generator: As a first step, we develop the lexer
and parser grammar (.g4) files required to translate the vendor-
specific IoT apps to an abstracted intermediate representation
(i.e., Abstracted LISP Representation (ALR) and Abstracted Tree
Representation (ATR) formats) with ANTLR module. ANTLR
parser generator uses the Abstracted LISP representations (ALR)
of the IoT Apps for performing the code sanity analysis (dis-
cussed in Section 4.2). Note, both the ALR and the ATR repre-
sentations of IoT apps are not exposed to end users, only the
outcome of VI graph generator ( 2 ) will be exposed to users and
composition engine.
• VI Graph generator: In the next step, automation rules repre-
sented in the Abstracted LISP syntax representation are con-
sumed by the VI Graph-generator module to translate it to
vendor-independent graph-based policies (as shown in Figure 5).
We built (.map) file, which is used for maintain necessary map-
pings between different vendor-specific automation/policy at-
tributes and vendor-independent graph attributes. These vendor-
independent attributes (or labels) are used in the construc-
tion of final vendor-independent graph-based representation.
The vendor-independent graph-based specifications outcome of
VISCR ( 2 ) is captured using networkx python library for main-
taining the policy graphs, required for composing the policy
graphs to detect the conflicts (discussed in Section 5).
4.2 Code Sanity Analysis
Currently, IoT administrators use both the vetted and unvetted
IoT apps from the market place and customize them to cater their
specific automation needs. Though, Groovy-based SmartThings
market apps are heavily vetted for sanity, but still there wide range
of unvetted SmartThings apps that are available online for use.
Directly customizing the IoT apps without effectively analyzing
them or testing could lead to incoherent automation. This problem is
also highly prevalent with other programming specifications such
as OpenHAB and IFTTT.
2Currently MUD-profiles are limited to support ACL-based traffic filtering rules. It
does not support dynamic trigger and action-based policies yet.
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Figure 5:Vendor-independent representation outcome of VISCR for
Policy P2 specified using Groovy-based SmartThings app (Table 1).
The most prominent code sanity bugs that are reported today
could include – Undefined & Unused variables and structures, im-
proper If/Else closures, missing quotes, and empty If/Else blocks, and
empty definition, which VISCR verifies for. For example (as shown
in Figure 1), OpenHAB automation framework allows IoT programs
to reference undefined variables and functions, and similarly not
reference to the variables and functions that are defined in the IoT
app. Though, in both the cases OpenHAB automation framework
allowed IoT programs to run successfully with out reporting any
compile time errors, but resulted in run-time violation or device
misbehavior [12, 13]. Other code sanity bugs that leaves IoT infras-
tructure vulnerable are illustrated in Figure 1. In these examples, the
IoT devices are not allowed to execute action “or” did not allow the
device to transition to new state, which could lead to either safety
or security vulnerability in the IoT infrastructure (as highlighted in
Figure 1).
VISCR detects such code sanity bugs using the ALRs provided
by the ANTLR parser generator module i.e., before giving it as
input to the VI graph generator module). In case of the defined-
but-unreferenced variables and functions, they are reported as less
severe bugs as they do not break the functional capability of the
IoT infrastructure. Similarly, the Undefined-but-referenced variables
and functions, and empty if blocks are reported as critical bugs by
the VISCR engine as these bugs could leave gap in the automation
making IoT infrastructure vulnerable.
Similarly, there are other code sanity bugs, such as improper
closures in which either the if and/or else conditions are not prop-
erly closed, such improper termination of code blocks leads to
unexpected code flows leading to device misbehaving. For example,
missing quotes ("), and missing braces (}) as highlighted in the Fig-
ure 1 are commonly seen issues with OpenHAB and Groovy-based
IoT apps, while these issues are not captured during compile time
leading to run-time violations and IoT programmalfunction [12, 13].
The code sanity and the bug severity assigned to each of the IoT
apps are used in later stage to further detect the potential run-time
violations present in the IoT apps (discussed in Section 5.3).
4.3 Infrastructure Abstractions & Graph-based
Specification
As discussed in Section 4.1, VISCR supports mechanism to translate
the vendor-specific IoT Apps into vendor-independent graph-based
specification. In addition, VISCR also supports simple drag and
drop-based user interface that allows administrators to directly and
intuitively capture their policies in a vendor-agnostic manner using
nodes of infrastructure abstraction trees, as discussed below.
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Figure 6: Automatically constructed tree-based abstractions for the smart campus IoT infrastructure: (a) captures devices as leaf nodes and
Abstraction, (b) captures device capabilities and property values as leaf nodes, (c) captures the dynamic security states (e.g., authentication)
specific to IoT devices, (d) Temporal and Security State Abstractions of IoT infrastructure.
4.3.1 Tree-based Abstractions. The Infrastructure abstraction en-
gine automatically builds necessary abstraction trees required for
graph-based policy specification. The abstraction engine contin-
uously churns data from local IoT infrastructure and cloud data
sources of IoT devices using device and vendor-specific APIs for
building the abstractions [22, 23]. The data extracted from IoT de-
vice’s data sources as text and log messages are translated into data
tables by the data-source-driver engine that we designed for each
vendor’s data format.
Generation of such abstractions allow administrators to dele-
gate the responsibility of policy specification to sub-administrators.
For example, it is now possible for a global building/campus ad-
ministrator to assign Floor1 and Floor2 responsibilities to different
sub-administrators. Also, VISCR allows abstraction trees to be built
on physical or logical grouping of device (e.g., Figure: 6a & 6b). The
global administrator simply uses abstraction mappings to delegate
infrastructure to each of the administrator. Depending on the as-
signed abstraction mappings the abstraction engine generates the
abstraction trees. For example, to derive the abstraction tree shown
in Figure 6a (i.e., list of Nest devices of BLDG1 with firmware <17.01
organized as per floor and type of devices), the abstraction-mapping
required is:
abstraction-tree{"Nest-Firmware{<17.01}"} =
location{BLDG1}.floors{*}:
vendor-type{Nest}.device-category{*}:
devices{*}
Similarly, for capturing the list of devices and their capabilities
with respect to their vendor and device-types in an abstraction tree
(Figure 6b), required abstraction-mapping is:
abstraction-tree{"Capabilities{*}"} =
vendor-type{*}:
vendor-type{*}.device-category{*}:
devices{*}:
capabilities{*}
Representation of Abstractions: We represent IoT infrastruc-
ture as set of infrastructure-abstraction trees, specific to each of the
administrators. The root node of the abstraction tree (i.e., abstrac-
tion tree name) uniquely represents each of the abstraction tree
present inside the IoT ecosystem. The leaf nodes represents set
of individual devices. Each intermediate node represents different
infrastructure abstractions such as device types, device vendors, lo-
cation, temporal, application details. The infrastructure abstractions
trees implicitly capture the boolean Union operator represented
as sibling nodes in the abstraction tree. Similarly, the boolean AND
operator corresponds to the relationship between the child and
parent nodes of the abstraction tree. For representation, each level
of abstraction is separated with “:” operator, while the constraints
and conditions to be imposed on to that level is represented with a
“.” operator.
VISCR supports a diverse set of abstractions, which will allow IoT
administrators to capture different types of policies based on their
security status, locations, vendor-type and so on. These include:
(i) security-state abstractions, (ii) location-specific abstractions, (iii)
device- or vendor-specific abstractions, and (iv) application-specific
abstractions. Such tree-based abstractions allow administrators to
intuitively capture their automation and policy requirements.
4.3.2 Graph-based Specification. As discussed in Section 4.1, VISCR
engine translates the vendor-specific IoT Apps into two different
types of policies: (i) trigger- and action-based policies, and (ii) dy-
namic ACL-based policies. In addition to this capability, VISCR also
supports intuitive graph-based specification framework that allows
IoT administrators to directly express their policy intents through
simple drag and drop-based user interface (UI), which uses policy
attributes from tree-based abstractions.
Trigger- & Action-based Policies: The trigger & action-based
policies allows the administrator to capture their policy intents for
set of IoT devices that perform some predefined action in response
to an triggering event. Examples of such policies represented as
graph-based policies are illustrated in Figure 7a. These types of poli-
cies can be specified as complex graph-based policies or finite state
automation (FSM), where each of the node captures abstractions,
device names, conditions or actions. Our trigger- and action-based
policy graphs have the following format: source IoT device with
associated states, set of conditions, dynamic states, associated set
of events and respective action/s on target IoT devices.
The source node represents the IoT device on which the event
is received. Rest of the nodes represent conditions and state of the
IoT infrastructure, except for nodes that have incoming edge with
sequential (>>) and parallel (| |) action operators associated with
them. The sequential and parallel operators >> and | | are used to
specify the sequence of IoT-commands that need to be executed.
The +/− operators are used to add or remove the list of ACLs that
are specific to the current state or condition.
ACL-based Policies: This type of policies either allows or restricts
the communication between devices and internet according to the
dynamic infrastructure states and conditions. Examples of graph-
based access control policies are shown in Figure 7b. For the trigger
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(b) ACL-based IoT policy specification.
Figure 7: Examples of Vendor-Independent Graph-based IoT Policy Specification with policy attributes highlighted in different color.
and action-based policy shown in Figure 7a, we implicitly add ACLs
to ALLOW traffic between Belkin CO device and other devices on
which the action is enforced (i.e., Camera, Water heater, Windows,
Exhaust). In reality, as the communication happens indirectly be-
tween the hub or cloud interface and the Belkin device, equivalent
ACLs are added to the network.
The starting and end nodes represents the source and destina-
tion entities of policies. The edge between the source and target
node captures following properties: (i) set of network functions
through which the traffic should traverse, i.e., network function
chain (NFC), (ii) conditions to be enforced on the traffic depending
on the state, and (iii) actions to be taken on the traffic between the
source and destination entities. With both the ACLs and trigger-
action-based policies, the states and conditions are represented as
nodes along the path for simplified design in the drag-and-drop-
based graph specification framework. Alternatively, these could be
represented as simple edge properties. The → and −x→ arrowed-
lines represents the action (i.e., ALLOW/DENY) on the traffic. The
specification syntax, keywords, attributes, symbols and operators
used by VISCR for processing the graph-based policies i.e., ACL-
based policies and trigger and action-based policies are discussed
in Section 4.3.3.
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(b) Equivalent policy specification syntax of ACL-based policies
(ACL1 – ACL3) illustrating different properties.
Figure 8: Examples of ACL-based & Trigger and Action-
based IoT policy specification syntax.
4.3.3 Graph-based Policies Specification Syntax. An equivalent
specification syntax is required for capturing each of these graph-
based policies in the backend. For example, in the ACL-based pol-
icy specification syntax, the permissions to communicate between
source and target nodes is specified using action attributes => (i.e.,
ALLOW) and ! => (i.e., DENY) symbols. The sequence of network
functions through which the traffic from a specific source node
should traverse to reach the target node or the sequence of actions to
be taken is specified using the sequential or parallel operators (e.g.,
Firewall >> DPI, FW | | LB, Exhaust=ON >> ExhaustSpeed=High).
Note that the sequence and parallel operators are used for traversal
of a set of middleboxes in the case of ACL-based policies. In case of
trigger-action-based policies, it is used to represent the sequence of
actions. Also, in the trigger-action-based policy specification syntax,
actions are captured using the iot-commands-action keyword.
Type Symbol Definition
Policy spec-
ification
keywords
location{}, devices{}, device-
type{}, device-vendors{},
parent{}, traffic-type{},
source-node{}, target-
node{}, source-state{},
target-state{}, etc.,
Keywords for capturing policy at-
tributes and the properties of the
IoT infrastructure.
Sequence &
Precedence
Operators
>> (serial or precedence),
| | (parallel), → (flow / ac-
tion sequence)
Operators to specify the sequence
of operations to be carried out in
policy.
Conditional
Operators
!, =, <, > Operations used to specify dynamic
conditions in the policy.
Composition
Operators
policy-add (+), policy-
remove (−)
Operators for adding and removing
policies from the existing list of poli-
cies.
Action at-
tributes /
Keywords
iot-commands-action, =>
(ALLOW), ! => (DENY)
Attributes or keywords used to
specify the actions to be taken in
the policies.
Table 2: List of keywords, attributes, operators and symbols used
in VISCR policy specification syntax.
VISCR allows duplicate node names to be captured as part of
same or different policy abstraction trees, which could lead to
discrepancies when policies are specified using these nodes. To
overcome this problem, we maintain the root nodes names of pol-
icy abstraction trees be unique across the IoT infrastructure. We
use the “parent” keyword to uniquely identical nodes across dif-
ferent abstraction trees. The → operator is used with parent to
define the path of the source entity from its parent. For example,
following reserved keywords are used to group set of devices device-
types{“Cameras”}, vendor-types{“Nest”}, location{“BLDG1→ Floor1”},
and smoke_co_alarm_state {“emergency”}. Other keywords, opera-
tors, and symbols used in VISCR are listed in Table 2. For the trigger
and action-based illustrated in Figure 7a the equivalent syntax is
shown in Figure 8a. Similarly, for the ACL-based policies illustrated
in Figure 7b, the equivalent policy specification syntax is shown in
the Figure 8b.
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5 GRAPH COMPOSITION & SECURITY
ANALYSIS
Manually detecting and effectively resolving the compile-time con-
flicts and run-time violations among automation policies even in
small-scale IoT deployments is an arduous and error-prone process.
Hence, VISCR effectively addresses this challenge in this section.
5.1 Rogue policies
VISCR’s abstraction trees and graph-based specification allows the ad-
ministrators to specify the policies explicitly using the abstraction
trees exposed to each of the IoT users or administrators. This ap-
proach of isolating and assigning explicit infrastructure abstractions
to each admin, allows VISCR to prevent admins from specifying
policies on the infrastructure they do not own. However, it should
be noted that the policies that are directly specified using policy
abstraction syntax (as discussed in Section 4.3.3) i.e., bypassing the
web-based user interface provided by graph-based policy specifica-
tion is also detected for rogue policies by the policy composition
engine and updated to the administrators as violations.
For detecting rogue policies in syntax-based policy specification,
the policy composition engine extracts the source and target nodes
from the specified policy specification syntax and verifies if both
the nodes belongs to the policy abstraction trees owned by that
administrator. If the policy attributes used in the policy specification
are part of the abstraction trees assigned to that admin, then the
policies are allowed to perform actual policy composition to further
detect other conflicts and violations (discussed in Section 5.3). The
policies violating this step is reported as rogue policies.
5.2 Graph-based Composition
The policy composition in VISCR seeks to provide the following
capabilities: (i) proactive composition of policies for detecting con-
flicts in compile time rather than detecting at run time, (ii) auto-
matic resolution of conflicts using precedence mechanism, and (iii)
incremental composition that allows trigger-action policies to adapt
to the environment at runtime. However, allowing run-time policy
composition imposes stringent latency constraints. Hence, policy
composition time has to be minimized.
VISCR’s policy composition procedure involves following key
steps. First, the normalization step brings all the policies specified
by various administrators, using different abstraction trees, to a
common abstraction level for identification of contradictory and
duplicate policies. The second step, finds contradictions among
normalized policies by running composition engine and resolves the
conflicts using precedence rules. Unresolved conflicts are flagged
to the administrator.
5.2.1 Proactive & Incremental Composition. The goal of policy
composition mechanism is to produce conflict-free composed policy
graph (example shown in Figure 9) that is derived by composing to-
gether overall vendor-independent graph-based policies (i.e., either
generated from IoT apps or specified directly by policy administra-
tors). In the final composed graph, the source and target entities
represent the devices or group of devices onto which policies are ex-
ecuted. The edges capture the set of conditions for policy activation
and the corresponding actions.
As a first step of policy composition, VISCR’s normalization
mechanism identifies the common abstraction level to which all
policies specified by administrators need to reduced for conflict de-
tection. If policies are specified using abstraction nodes at different
levels of an abstraction tree, composing policies without normal-
ization is an infeasible task. For example, consider two policies
specified using the abstractions BLDG1 and Floor2 (homogeneous
abstractions) or using BLDG1 and NestCams (heterogeneous ab-
stractions). Here, we do not know if the Floor1 node and Nest node
have any relation (i.e., subset, superset, or overlapping hosts or
devices) for composing them together into a single policy graph.
We resolve this issue by (a) automatically deriving relations across
non-leaf nodes of different abstraction trees and maintain these
relations as mappings i.e., capturing the details of set of devices
or hosts that belongs to each of these nodes of abstraction trees,
and (b) choosing an optimum level to which the nodes used in the
policy specification need to be normalized.
Normalization: A naive normalization approach is to bring all the
policies to the bottom most level, i.e. leaf node level which cap-
tures the device-specific details for performing composition. This
approach increases complexity along two dimensions: (i) It brings
down all policies to the bottom most level even though very small
number of policies might need it, exponentially increasing the com-
position times, and (ii) normalizing all the source and destination
policy nodes to bottom most level (i.e., to the level of leaf nodes)
also increases the enforcement complexity, due to increase in the
number of rules required to enforce the policies. Therefore, VISCR
finds an intermediate level i.e., Enforcement Level (ELevel) for each
policy abstraction tree for effectively normalizing the policies. The
enforcement level (ELevel) is chosen in such a way it would allow
the policy enforcement engine to directly compile/translate these
composed policies to enforceable rules.
Mathematically, we represent the choice of enforcement level
in the following way. Let Ki be the abstraction level using which
a policy Pi (i = 1, . . . ,N ) is specified. Then, policy Pi can be nor-
malized any abstraction level Ai ≥ Ki . Thus, we aim to normalize
to a level A such that A ≥ Ai ∀i = 1, . . . ,N . However, the number
of nodes increases with an increase in Ai . Thus, our objective is
to choose the minimum value of A that satisfies the above set of
constraints, i.e.
Minimize A subject to: A ≥ Ki ∀i = 1, . . . ,N . (1)
Algorithm 1 describes the graph-composition algorithm, which
accepts: (i) a list of graph-based policies that are normalized, and (ii)
an empty graph as input, which is used for storing the composed
policy graph. Each of the input policy is composed with the graph
for conflict identification and resolution. The list of input policies
are iteratively checked for an identical or conflicting policy. First
each policy’s source node is compared with the source nodes of the
composed policy graph. Next, the target node of the input policy
is compared with the target nodes of the composed policy graph.
Finally, the conditions and action attributes present along the edge
of the input policy are compared with the edge attributes of the
composed policy graph. In this process, the composed policy graph
is updated with non-conflicting policy attributes.
The algorithm attempts to resolve conflicts by checking whether
a precedence rules exists for any of the policies. Duplicate policies
8
Algorithm 1 Graph-based Policy Composition
1: L ← list of normalized policies to be added
2: s(p) ← source node of policy p
3: t (p) ← destination node of policy p
4: a(p) ← action of policy p
5: b((s, t )) ← action of edge (s, t )
6: G ← Composed graph
7: for all Policy p ∈ L do:
8: if s(p) ∈ G & t (p) ∈ G then
9: if (b(s, t ) ∈ G & a(p) == b(s, t ) then
10: Discard p ▷ Duplicate Policy
11: else if b(s, t ) ∈ G & a(p) , b(s, t ) then
12: Apply b(s, t ) or a(p) based on precedence
13: Raise conflict alert if policies have equal precedence
14: else if b(s, t ) < G then
15: Create b(s, t ) from p
16: Add b(s, t ) to G ▷ Add policy
17: else
18: if s(p) < G then
19: Create s(p)
20: if t (p) < G then
21: Create t (p)
22: Create b(s, t ) from p
23: Add b(s, t ) to G ▷ Add policy
return G
are tracked separately and discarded from composition. If it finds
a conflicting policy that cannot be resolved with precedence, the
policy is dropped from the graph (Lines 11-13) and notified to
administrator. If it finds that the source node and the destination
node both exist and no conflicts are possible, the policy is then
added to the graph (Lines 14-16). Otherwise, it creates new nodes
and then adds the policies as edges to the graph (Lines 17-23).
To analyze the algorithmic time complexity, we need to evaluate
the cost of iterating over the complete list of policies (L), and adding
them to the composed Graph G. With the addition of each policy
to the composed policy graph G, the composition engine checks
for the existence of conflicts. The major time complexity of the
algorithm lies with the iteration of the policies O(L) over the list of
all source nodes Ls in the composed graph G, and then comparing
the policy’s source node s(p) to composed graph’s source nodes
S(G). Le is the list of edges for which the edge-properties overlap
with the policy’s edge among the overlapping source nodes. Also, Lt
is the list of target nodes of the edges of s(p) that actually overlaps
with the target node of the policy pi . Therefore, the overall worst-
case complexity is: O(L ∗ Ls ∗ Le ∗ Lt ).
For reducing the composition complexity we employ hashing
mechanism and caching technique: (i) them host entries of s(p) are
hashed as key-value pairs and the host entities of S(G) are looked
up in the hash for the existence of the n hosts, reducing baseline
complexity will be reduced to: O(L ∗ Ls ∗ (m + n)). (ii) caching the
comparison calculation outcome as key-value pairs (s(p):S(G)) in
hash table reduces the overall baseline complexity to O(L ∗ Ls ).
5.2.2 Precedence. Precedence rules are used to resolve con-
flicts among competing policies specified at different levels.
Administrator-level precedence evaluation is based on the scope
of authority of the policy author. For example, a campus-level ad-
ministrator in a smart campus may be granted precedence over a
building administrator; Action-level precedence allows for explicit
prioritization in action invocation. For example, for IoT traffic’s
ACL-based policies, Drop > Allow > Quarantine > Redirect can be
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Figure 9: Sample outcome of graph-based policies composed to-
gether representing final composed policy graph. Possible missing
states are highlighted in the figure with dotted lines.
used as the precedence hierarchy. Similarly, in the case of trigger-
action-based policies, when the smoke detector is in fire-alarm
state, the action turn OFF heating is given higher precedence than
turn ON heating. Custom precedence enables policy attributes (e.g.,
user, device type, device state) to be associated with precedence.
When two policies (P1 and P2) conflict, the nodes and edges of the
policies are decomposed into the set of subset nodes that requires the
least number of edges to represent conflict-free policies (for optimizing
the number of rules required for enforcement). Based on precedence,
the overlapping nodes that result in conflict are removed and the
edge specific to the policy with highest precedence is retained.
5.2.3 Incremental Updates. The dynamic characteristics of the con-
sumer IoT infrastructure demand that the policy framework be
agile in enforcing new set of rules to IoT devices. Since complete
policy composition consumes time, up to a few minutes, efficient
re-composition techniques are required for rapid policy response.
Hence, we use incremental policy composition to ensure an expedi-
ent response to dynamic conflicts that arise in the network. The
composition engine recomposes only the updated set of policies
with the whole set of composed policies. Updating a policy from the
composition graph involves first deleting the policy from the graph,
and then inserting amodified version. Deleting a policy requires one
to remove the edges that belong to the policy from graph. However,
the composition procedure might have removed portions of other
policies that had a higher precedence during conflict resolution.
Hence, these lost portions must be returned.
Incremental policy composition reduces the time to react to dy-
namic state changes and enforce new rules under the following
scenarios: (i) Scenario 1: New polices are added or removed from
the IoT infrastructure; (ii) Scenario 2: IoT infrastructure changes
(e.g., device location updates, new devices added or existing devices
removed); and (iii) Scenario 3: IoT device-state changes (e.g., from
normal to compromised). Also, for run-time composition VISCR enu-
merates all the possibilities to pre-calculate the possible outcomes.
Hence, for run-time enforcement VISCR simply identifies the out-
come specific to the event and simply executes it, which can be
carried out in sub-second latency, much faster than incremental
composition.
5.3 Security Analysis & Policy Enforcement
In this section, we describe about how we use the graph-based
composed policy graph to perform security analysis for detecting
the bugs and violations. We discuss about the conflict-free policy
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enforcement by reconciling policies to device-specific rules and
automatic policy inference.
5.3.1 Gap Analysis. Gap in the automation could leave the IoT
infrastructure in a state that is either unstable or unpredictable in
its behavior. Such dangling state could make IoT infrastructures
vulnerable to attacks. For example the policies S5, S12 and S14 shows
the gap in the automation with respect to its temporal and tem-
perature conditions (as described in Table 4). It is evident from
these policies that during 8PM –9PM (conflict) 9PM – 9AM (Gap)
the thermostat’s temperature settings could not be effectively pre-
dicted. As listed in Table 4, similar automation gap could be visible
in other types of policies specific to its spatial, security states and
other environmental conditions. Therefore, identifying the gap in
automation is key step towards detecting the potential bugs that
might arise in the IoT infrastructure during run-time.
The VICE module traverses through the final composed policy
graph to identify the missing states or conditions for which the
policies are not captured (as shown in Figure 9). This is achieved by
enumerating and verifying if the policies exist for all the possible
temporal, spatial and security conditions (e.g., states captured as
part of abstraction tree’s leaf nodes such as shown in Figure 6d),
which helps in identifying potentially missing policies i.e., gap in
automation. For example, the possible security states of IoT infras-
tructure could be Normal, compromised, monitoring and quarantine
(Figure 6d). By identifying the missing states and their associated
policies using the abstractions tree as reference, we can effectively
detect the gap in automation.
The completeness of the gap analysis depends on the abstraction
engine’s ability to extract all the possible states, conditions and
infrastructure details captured as part of the abstraction tree. For
example, the temporal, spatial and security abstractions that are
auto-generated by the abstraction engine could be verified by user
for its correctness, allowing the administrator to add the missing
states as leaf nodes to the abstraction trees.
5.3.2 Loops in Automation. In general detecting chains and loops
within the automation rules is essential to detect the potential
conflicts and violations that might arise during run-time, which are
rather challenging to be detected at policy compile time. From the
composed policy graph, we detect the loops as follows: (i) We check
for existence of pathswith in a composed policy graph that hasmore
than one trigger and action pair (i.e., chaining among policies). (ii)
Check if any of the actions along the path triggers back any of the
events with in the chain. (iii) Check if any of the actions along the
path triggers any of the events with in the chain resulting in taking
different action, which results in ambiguity and continuous toggling
of states and actions. Loops among the policies with continuously
toggling actions are marked as conflicts, while the identified policy
chains are marked for potential violations (e.g., policies S5, S6, S7
and S10 in Table 4). These policies when realized together will result
in either unintended behavior, continuous toggling of actions or
might result in unsafe state i.e., leaves door locked or opened during
unanticipated instance of time resulting safety violations or sets
unintended temperature conditions in home.
5.3.3 Potential Conflicts. Existing tools lacks support for proac-
tively detecting the policy violations that might arise during run-
time. Consider for example policies S10 and S15, which results in
run-time violations. These two policies does not have any thing in
common except the actions taken by them i.e., S10 closes windows in
case of specific outdoor temperature, while S15 opens the windows
in case of raining and humidity. Therefore, identifying the run-time
conflicts is a challenging task with such policies. As a straw-man
solution one could mark all the policies that has conflicting actions
and lack of specific temporal attributes among these policies as
potential violation. Such approach will result in generating vast
false positive. Exposing large number of false positives to novice
smart home users could prevent them from using the automation
framework, rendering these tools useless.
Therefore, it is essential to identify a means by which the poten-
tial violations are “proactively” detected and fine-tuned to avoid
run-time violations. To identify potential run-time violations VISCR,
checks formutually exclusiveness3 among the policies. For detecting
potential run-time violation, we build relation among all the events,
states and environmental conditions that are part of the IoT infras-
tructure and cluster the events. By clustering the events, states and
conditions, we will be able to effectively detect if parameters among
any two policies are mutually exclusive or not. To achieve this, we
encode our policies [24] (i.e., captured as policy tuple: <source-node,
source-state, edge states/conditions, target-node, target-state, actions>)
and use k-means clustering with elbow method [25] for effectively
clustering different types of triggering conditions and associated
states. If the policy states and conditions are not mutually exclusive
(i.e., on the basis of cluster distance) and pose conflicting actions
are considered to generate potential violations during run-time.
In addition, for the list of policies that are marked to generate
potential run-time violations, we develop the severity metric to
prioritize the reported violations, which allow administrators to fix
the violations in the order of their severity. We take into consid-
eration the lack of temporal attributes, code sanity and relations
derived among states as metric (i.e., aggregated sum of weights
derived from all these three factors) and uses z-score and correla-
tion ranking mechanism to evaluate the severity ranking of any
potential violation [26, 27].
5.3.4 Policy Reconciliation and Inference. As discussed in Section
4.1, the policy mappings (i.e., mapping between the IoT app and
the respective graph-based policy) maintained by the VISCR engine
helps in effectively enforcing the policies after the conflicts are
detected and resolved. The conflict-free composed policy graph
along with these mappings are provided as input to the policy
reconciliation engine (Figure 2). We develop APIs that effectively
leverage this association and reconcile composed policy graph to
device-specific IoT apps for enforcement. The policies that are
directly provided as graph-based policy input to the VISCR are
reconciled to device-specific rules and distributed on to network of
IoT devices on the basis of: (i) vendor-type, (ii) device location, (iii)
source devices that are generating the triggering events, and (iv)
destination nodes on which the actions need to be enforced.
3Two policies are mutually exclusive, when no two events, conditions or states among
these policies are not related to each other or can co-exist i.e., occur at the same
instance of time.
10
Figure 10: Inferred policy proposed to administrator for fine-
tuning existing policy (P3). Yes to accept it as true positive and No to
reject false positive. Propose new policy for fine-tuning the policy
P3 i.e., propose new time to access the main door.
In case of multiple devices that can accommodate same rule, the
rules are distributed uniformly preventing any of the IoT devices
from getting overloaded [28, 29]. Upon choosing the right set of
devices on which the rules are required to be placed, the reconcili-
ation engine translates it device-specific rules for configuring or
programming the specific device.
As a strawman solution, we infer new policies in accordance
with dynamic changes in the behavior of IoT ecosystem for fine-
tuning the automation. For example, a newly inferred policy that
is proposed to an IoT administrator for fine-tuning the existing
main door access policy (P3) is shown in Figure 10. We plan to
enhance the technique to efficiently infer new policies from the IoT
ecosystem and propose right set of policies to IoT administrator
for fine-tuning the existing policies ‘or’ resolving the run-time
violations (i.e., with reduced or no false positives) as part of our
future work (§7).
6 PROTOTYPE & EVALUATION
We developed the complete prototype implementation of VISCR
in Python and integrated it with our VISCR policy specification
dashboard. We implemented following components in VISCR:
The abstraction engine of VISCR is integrated with vendor-
specific cloud data sources for extracting dynamic states and con-
figurations of IoT devices. We developed data-source drivers for IoT
devices that translates logs and text data into data tables. The data
source drivers of VISCR is integrated with the Congress engine [30],
which is enhanced to generate datalog rules required for automati-
cally generating tree-based infrastructure abstractions based on the
abstraction mappings supplied by administrators. The data-push
option provided by each of the vendor’s cloud data-sources allows
VISCR to capture the log messages specific to dynamic updates in
the IoT network.
The graph-based policies specified using the abstraction tree
nodes are translated first into equivalent vendor-independent spec-
ification syntax and ultimately into a graph dictionary. We used
the networkx Python library[31] for capturing and building pol-
icy graphs. For visualizing graph-based policies and the composed
policy graph, we built the VISCR policy specification dashboard
integrated with networkx [31] and GraphViz library [32]. VISCR
maintains necessary mapping between the IoT apps and graph-
based policies, which helps the reconciliation engine to effectively
translate composed graph-based policies back to IoT programs dur-
ing policy enforcement (as discussed in Section 5.3.4).
The composition engine captures the policies in networkx-based
graphs, runs normalization and composition algorithms to detect
the conflicts and resolves them using precedence rules that are
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Figure 11: Simulated Smart building IoT Infrastructure for 907 IoT
Apps using Groovy-based SmartThings, OpenHAB, IFTTT-based
Applets andMUD profiles with 30 different devices from 8 different
vendors. For simplicity only 11 different types of devices are shown
here.
maintained as key value pairs. These conflict-free policies are fur-
ther analyzed for other bugs and violations. Finally, the composed
conflict-free policies are translated to enforceable rules i.e., IoT apps
and device-specific configurations. The VISCR’s policy composition
outcome is interfaced with the VISCR specification dashboard for
fine-tuning the policies before enforcement.
6.1 Evaluation
Testbed.We used simulated smart building IoT infrastructure with
907 IoT apps or automation policies framed with 30 different types
of consumer IoT devices from 8 different vendors framed for mul-
tiple floors of the building. For brevity few policies (Table 3) and
simulated smart building view of single floor (shown in the Figure
11). The VISCRmodule is run on a Dell R710 server with 48GB RAM,
12 cores (2.6GHz) with Ubuntu 4.4.0-97-generic kernel.
Datasets.We use IoT market apps (i.e., both vetted and unvetted),
extracted from vendor marketplaces, and publicly available data
sources for the smart-home and smart-campus use cases [33–37],
also consolidated in our VISCR repository [38]. We have built fol-
lowing three datasets for our experiments:
DS-1: We simulate a smart building IoT infrastructure (as shown
in Figure 11) with multiple floors and automate it with 907 IoT
apps. We use 907 Groovy-based IoT apps (i.e., homogeneous spec-
ifications) for evaluating static analysis-based technique (such as
Soteria [9]) and compare with VISCR. The same set of automa-
tion rules programmed with Groovy, OpenHAB, IFTTT, and MUD
profiles (i.e., heterogeneous specifications) are used for evaluat-
ing VISCR. With dataset DS-1, we evaluate our policy composition
engine for detecting static violations and compare it with static vio-
lation detection mechanism (e.g., Soteria). In addition to detecting
static policy conflicts, VISCR also detects other type of conflicts,
violations and bugs from the dataset DS-1 (as highlighted in Table
4).
DS-2: We use the smart-home, smart-campus and smart-city ab-
stractions dataset [34, 36, 39–41] for evaluating the performance of
our tree-based abstraction engine in constructing the abstraction
trees.
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Policies Smart Building Policy Description
S1 Any time fire is detected, turn on sprinklers and cameras, and shut down
all locks (doors and windows)
S2 Any time water leak is detected on office walls, cut the water supply
S3 From 10PM to 7AM keep the outer doors and windows locked
S4 From 6PM to 11PM keep the bedroom1 window unlocked or open
S5 From 8PM to 9PM set the thermostat to 65◦F in bedrooms (kid)
S6 Between 6PM to 10PM (i.e., till 11PM) keep the main doors unlocked
S7 If main doors and windows are open for more than 5 minutes, turn OFF
the heating/cooling in that room to prevent energy wastage
S8 If motion is detected then turn the camera ON
S9 If outside humidity is <40% and >50%, make sure outer doors and
windows are lockedwhile maintaining humidity between 40 – 50% inside.
S10 When outside temperature is between 60-75◦F open the windows and
turn OFF cooling
S11 From 10PM to 7AM if any of the outer doors and windows are unlocked,
trigger the alarm and SMS notify
S12 From 9AM to 9PM set the thermostat to 74◦F (parent)
S13 Turn bedroom II Camera OFF (or no access) after 10PM (kid)
S14 If building temperature rises above 95◦F, lock all windows and reset the
thermostat to 65◦F
S15 In case of rain and humidity <40% and >50% close the windows
S16 Keep Camera ON in all rooms and access to it at any time (parent)
Table 3: Example list of Smart building policies (S1-S16).
Policy
Con-
flict
Conflict Description Conflict
Type
S1 , S2 An incident where fire is detected by smoke alarm (S1), sprin-
kler is triggered this can be flagged as a water leakage (S2),
which results is cutting down water supply interrupting func-
tionality of sprinkler. Thus, resulting in a fire spread.
Static
S1 , S3 When fire is detected between 10PM and 7AM by smoke alarm
(S1), all doors and windows are unlocked (open). With S3
both exterior door and all windows must be locked (close)
during this time. This can result in exterior doors and windows
toggling from locked or unlocked resulting in unintended
behavior.
Static,
Loops
S1 , S14 If temperature raises above 90◦F, it will enforce that all win-
dows must be locked and thermostat be set to 65◦F (S14). Con-
flicts with temperature raised due to fire event (S1).
Static
S9 , S10 With overlapping state between S9 and S10 , i.e, it’s humid
and also temperature is between 60-82◦F, in such situation
windows can toggle between locked and unlocked.
Static
S5 , S6 ,
S7
Between 7PM and 9PM the outer door and windows are locked,
thus trigger for both S5 and S7 are valid as a result system
will toggle between turning off thermostat and setting it to
65◦F. Similarly, S6 can further intervene due to time overlap
and can result in chain and again forming a loop.
Chain,
Loop
S7 , S10 When temperature outside is 60 – 75◦F, S10 opens the win-
dows, which can possibly trigger S7 given exterior doors are
unlocked too. This policy chaining might result in unintended
temperature conditions inside home.
Chain
S3 , S4 Rogue behaviour as S3 is set by parent and S4 is set by a kid
for a bedroom1 window’s opening.
Rogue
S5 , S12 Rogue behaviour as S12 is set by admin1 (or parent) and S13
is set by admin2 (or kid) on bedroom1 in setting thermostat.
Rogue
S13 , S16 Rogue behaviour as S13 is set by parent and S16 set by kid in
accessing kid’s room Camera after 10PM.
Rogue
S5 , S12 Gap in automation between 9PM – 9AM, where thermostat
condition is not specified and conflict during 8PM – 9PM.
Gap,
Static
S14 Gap as condition is not specified for temperature less than
95◦F (i.e., between 74◦F to 95◦F).
Gap
S10 , S15 When it is both raining and temperature between 60 – 75◦F,
conflicting actions arise i.e., undecidable if windows should
be opened or closed
Potential
Viola-
tion
Table 4: Smart building conflicts, bugs and violations detected by
VISCR. For simplicity few conflicts are reported for the policies de-
scribed in Table 3.
DS-3: We have built tool to generate ≈20K synthetic policies em-
ulating the dataset DS-1, using the policy abstraction trees gen-
erated from DS-2. We use random sampling technique to select
Security Analysis % IoT App
Violations
% False
Positives
Compile time conflicts 6.6 0
Potential run-time violations 7.9 1.8
Gap analysis 10.4 1.3
Rogue Policies 3.8 0
Access violations 1.6 0
App sanity checker (SC) 4.2 0.7
Loops & chains 3.2 0
Overall 37.7 3.8
Table 5: Bugs and Violations detected on smart building IoT infras-
tructure dataset DS-1. % of policy violations and bugs along with the
the source nodes, destination nodes and edge properties (e.g., dy-
namic environmental states, conditions, and traffic type) from the
policy-abstraction trees.
6.1.1 Policy Abstraction. We evaluate the performance of policy
abstraction engine with smart city data of up to 100K devices using
DS-2. We built upto 400 policy abstraction trees with four levels of
abstractions using the dataset. For generating abstraction trees, the
abstraction engine need to join hundreds of data tables perform-
ing thousands of table join operations. It look <1.2sec to generate
upto 400 abstraction trees with 100K leaf nodes in parallel (Figure
12a). The latency performance of abstraction engine stays mostly
linear considering the data join operations it performs to generate
the abstraction trees. Since extracting data from the network data
sources takes random times considering the network latency, we
discard network latency parameter in the calculation of abstract
tree generation.
6.1.2 Security analysis. We evaluate the performance of our con-
flict detection and resolution engine with DS-1 (i.e., 907 IoT market
apps) simulated to program the smart building IoT infrastructure
(as shown in Figure 11) and compare it with Soteria’s violation
detection mechanism. Applying model checking, we were able to
find 6.6% of the static violations across policies on DS-1, which
includes both property and state violations. As shown in Table
5, VISCR on the other hand was able to find ∼37.7% of violations
within same IoT apps in DS-1. Importantly, VISCR detected 100%
of the violations captured by the static analysis technique such as
Soteria. Among the 37.7% of IoT apps VISCR reported 10.2% of
IoT apps that has more than one violations. Importantly, different
class of violations reported by VISCR is illustrated with examples
in Table 4.
In addition, VISCR identifies following major types of conflicts
and violations: (i) gap in automation due to the inability of users to
completely realize the use-case scenario resulted in 10.4% of total
IoT apps being violated with 1.3% false positives; (ii) code-sanity
and programming errors in temporal and spatial policies as well as
policies involving specific values (e.g., temperature, humidity, time,
space) resulted in 4.2% of violations with 0.7% false positives, where
the undefined references are upto 1.1% and unused structures are
upto 2.1% of policies; (iii) policies that results in access violations
due prolonged access to resources beyond the specified period of
time counted upto 1.6% of IoT apps; (iv) rogue policies that are
implemented by administrators who are not authorized to specify
policies on portion of IoT infrastructures that they should not be
enforcing rules (with 3.8% of total IoT apps violated); (v) poten-
tial run-time violations that are detected from the policies, which
includes 7.9% of total violations; and (vi) finally, detected 3.2% of
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
# Leaf Nodes (Devices) × 1000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
La
te
nc
y 
(m
s)
(a) Average latency in building
abstraction trees in parallel with
increasing # leaf nodes.
0 200 400 600 800
# IoT Market App Programs
101
102
103
Ti
m
e(
se
c)
VISCR
Soteria
(b) Average composition latency
with increasing # IoT apps (with
∼30 policy attributes).
5 25 45 65 85
# IoT Automation Attributes
101
102
103
104
Ti
m
e(
se
c)
VISCR Soteria
(c) Average composition la-
tency with increasing # policy
attributes (with 907 IoT apps).
1 2 3 4
Depth
0
200
400
600
800
La
te
nc
y 
(s
ec
)
(d) Policy composition latency
for ∼20K synthetic policies with
abstraction tree depth.
Figure 12: Scalability of VISCR’ Policy abstraction&Composition Engine compared to static analysis-based technique (Soteria).
loops among the automation rules that resulted in the unintended
and unsafe environmental conditions. Overall, VISCR was able to
detect the above discussed violations and bugs with less than 3.8%
of false positives or low intensity bugs such as Unused variables or
structures and potential violations.
6.1.3 Policy Composition. The composition cost depends on fol-
lowing two factors: (i) the number of attributes or states used and
in the IoT apps, and (ii) the number of IoT apps. In this experiment,
we perform composition with increasing number of IoT apps (i.e.,
in subset of 100 apps in each iteration) and capture its composition
latency. We keep number of attributes constant at ∼30 in this exper-
iment (i.e., the IoT apps or automation use-cases are chosen only
specific to these attributes). For example, temperature is considered
as an attribute, while the subcategories (e.g., high, low, different
levels) of the attribute are still considered as part of the same tem-
perature attribute. We observed that VISCR took ∼80.7 seconds to
compose 907 apps, while using model checking (i.e., such as tech-
nique used in Soteria) took approximately 14.2×more time to run,
which took ∼1147 seconds to detect the conflicts (Figure 12b).
In the next experiment, we evaluate performance of conflict
detection engine with increasing number of attributes and constant
number of IoT apps (i.e., 907). With increase in the number of
attributes, the composition (i.e., conflict detection) cost of both
the approaches increased. VISCR took 231 seconds to compose 907
IoT apps and 100 different attributes, while Soteria took ∼3140
seconds, which is∼13×more time required to detect conflict (Figure
12c).
Following are the vital factors that contribute to improved per-
formance (i.e., reduced conflict detection time with our graph-based
composition) compared to Soteria: (i) The complex SAT formula-
tion resulting in enumeration of all possible states required to detect
the static violations. (ii) Our approach optimizes the composition
cost by parallelizing the translation procedure (i.e., translation of
IoT apps to vendor-independent graph-based specification); (iii)
With graph-based composition, we incrementally verify the source
nodes and if the overlap exists then further into edge and target
properties. This results in avoiding unnecessary comparison oper-
ation resulting in improved composition cost with our approach.
and (iv) Finally, the graph-based composition mechanism generates
the composed graph islands (i.e., policy graphs that are completely
independent), when once a policy is detected as conflicting with
one of the policy graph island, the policy is marked as conflicting
avoiding comparison with other nodes with in the same composed
graph and other graph islands. In addition, to provide fair compari-
son, we ran VISCR with 907 groovy-based apps, our composition
engine took <92.1 seconds to compose these apps.
As VISCR also support incremental composition (i.e., to support
dynamic changing IoT infrastructure), we evaluate the performance
of the incremental composition as follows. We compose 907 IoT
apps and generate the composed policy graph. We then randomly
choose 100 IoT apps each time and change its attributes and allow
it to incrementally recompose. From our experiments, it is evident
that for recomposing 10 IoT app programs took <2.1 seconds, while
recomposing 100 apps took ∼16.3 seconds. In normal working con-
ditions of any IoT infrastructure, it is expected to have fewer than
10 IoT app change at any instance of time.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of VISCR with large scale
synthetic dataset (DS-3) to emulate the smart city IoT infrastruc-
tures with ∼20K graph-based policies. We composed 20K graph-
based policies by choosing the source and target nodes of the poli-
cies at different levels of abstraction trees i.e., choosing nodes at
depth level 1 – level 4 of abstraction tree. We run this experiment
for multiple iterations to capture the average composition engine
latency. For depth level = 1, the composition cost is much higher
than when policy abstracts are chosen at level 4 as the nodes are
chosen more towards leaf node level results in much lesser normal-
ization cost. Therefore, 90% of the time our tool took <760 seconds
to compose 20K policies specified at level 1. Similarly for composing
the policies specified at level 4 VISCR took <300 seconds.
7 DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
As part of future work, we plan to develop a more comprehensive
drag-and-drop graphical interface that will allow users to express
a broader range of policies. We also plan to conduct a user study
that allows us to effectively evaluate the expressibility of VISCR.
VISCR’s tree-based abstraction engine, builds abstraction trees,
which are required for specifying the graph-based automation rules
or policies. The abstraction engine relies on existing IoT vendor
cloud data sources and network information base (e.g., DHCP server
DB, network resource DB). However, the lack of information across
data sources could result in incomplete abstraction trees and policy
specifications. Hence, as part of our future work, we plan to explore
machine-learning-based models to fill such information gaps.
VISCR partly supports the IoT device capabilities, which are re-
quired for translating the IoT apps into graph-based specifications.
Currently, VISCR supports vendor-independent graph-based spec-
ifications for four different types of automation specification lan-
guages [3, 5–7]. We plan to support other specification mechanisms
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such as Apple HomeKit [4] and add more device capabilities to
VISCR in our future work. Our framework provides necessary APIs
that will make adding new vendor-specific automation framework
much easier and seamless (as discussed in Section 4).
Automatic inference techniques have previously been explored
in the context of static code analysis for detecting bugs in systems
and web applications [42–44] and for reverse engineering proto-
cols [45]. Similar techniques have also been used for detecting bugs
and vulnerabilities in network configurations [46, 47]. We plan to
explore techniques to automatically infer IoT policies from a variety
of sources including the existing automation rules, IoT traffic, IoT
firmware, and IoT companion apps.
8 RELATEDWORK
Intent-based Policy Frameworks. Intent-based policies are well
studied in the domain of enterprise networks [48, 49]. However, they
provide limited flexibility in policy specification, while handling
complex and heterogeneous IoT devices. To overcome these limi-
tations in enterprise scenarios, recent works propose the creation
high-level intent-based languages, compilers and conflict detection
mechanisms [50–65], and new SDN programming paradigms [66–
68]. Prior efforts to develop graph-based policy specification mech-
anisms (PGA [21], Janus [69], LMS [70]) have focused on enterprise
networks. However, these graph-based policy frameworks do not
effectively handle dynamic trigger and action-based policies re-
quired by IoT devices. Hence, we propose to develop an intuitive
graph-based policy framework that handles dynamic trigger and
action-based policies and supports vendor-agnostic specification
models to seamlessly accommodate different types of IoT programs
including Groovy, OpenHAB, IFTTT, and MUD profiles.
Conflict-Detection&VerificationwithDynamic IoTPolicies.
Verification and testing of dynamic policies for middleboxes are
well-studied problems [71–78]. Unlike our work, prior studies do
not address the dynamic group-based policy requirement of IoT in-
frastructures to handle safety, security, and privacy policies. Recent
efforts have attempted to use formal verification techniques and
static taint tracking to verify the correctness of deployed automa-
tion policies in homogeneous IoT environments [9, 79–82]. Simi-
larly, recently proposed works highlighted the need for novel access
control models and policies to secure IoT infrastructures [8, 83].
However, existing IoT infrastructures are dynamic with diverse IoT
devices, programmed using heterogeneous programming frame-
works, that make static-verification techniques ineffective. Also,
a few recent studies that focus on identifying the policy conflicts
arising in complex smart-city infrastructures [84, 85] do not deal
with security or privacy issues. Similarly, Soteria [9], developed an
intermediate representation for Groovy-based IoT polices and used
model checking on it to verify the properties. We propose to build
a vendor-independent model, that allows automation rules or poli-
cies, specified using multiple commodity IoT apps to be translated
into vendor-independent policy-specification graphs for robust and
proactive conflict detection and resolution.
9 CONCLUSION
Emerging consumer IoT infrastructures are characterized by a grow-
ing number of heterogeneous devices. VISCR provides a unified
policy engine that allows for conflict-free policy specification and
enforcement in IoT infrastructure. VISCR achieves this by unify-
ing policy abstractions, automatically extracting IoT infrastructure
topology and converting diverse policy languages such as Groovy-
based SmartThings, OpenHAB, IFTTT-based templates, and MUD-
based profiles into a vendor-independent graph-based specification.
These abstractions enable VISCR to detect rouge policies, bugs, and
conflicts. They also allow for easier specification and efficient com-
position of dynamic policy intents, from users and administrators.
In a dataset of 907 IoT market apps with a mix of Groovy, OpeHAB,
IFTTT, and MUD-based policies, VISCR detected conflicts in 342
apps and provided resolution mechanism to it in under 81 seconds
and can adapt new policies with sub-second latency.
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